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                      Respondent 
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 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A099-079-707) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 3, 2011 
 Before:    SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges 







  Bi Juan Lin petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA”) final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the petition.  
I. 
  Lin is a native and citizen of China who lived in Lianjiang County in Fujian 
 Province.  In 2001, she entered the United States.  In July 2005, while pregnant with 
twins, she applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”).  In support of her application, Lin claimed that she feared she 
would be forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization upon returning to China because 
the birth of her twins would violate China’s family planning policies.  Shortly after she 
filed that application, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal 
proceedings against her, charging her with being removable as an alien who was 
inadmissible at the time of entry.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A).  Lin conceded her 
removability and continued to pursue the relief sought in her application.  
  In October 2005, Lin gave birth to twin girls.  In February 2006, after a 
hearing on the merits, the IJ concluded that Lin had demonstrated a well-founded fear of 
future persecution and granted her request for asylum.  The Government appealed the IJ’s 
decision to the BIA, and Lin moved for summary affirmance.  In December 2007, the 
BIA denied Lin’s motion and sustained the Government’s appeal.  In doing so, the BIA 
stated that it was not persuaded that Lin had demonstrated a well-founded fear of 
persecution.  The BIA noted that “[a]lthough [Lin] has submitted copies of the birth 
control guidelines in Lianjiang County, and has submitted proof that close relatives were 
sterilized after the birth of two children in China, she must show a reasonable possibility 
that local officials would enforce those guidelines and involuntarily sterilize her based 
upon the birth of twin girls in the United States.”  (A.R. at 342-43 (citations omitted).)  
The BIA further noted that the U.S. State Department’s 2005 country profile of China, 
 which was part of the record, “indicates that U.S. diplomats are not aware of any cases in 
which returnees from the United States were forced to undergo sterilization procedures 
on their return.”  (Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).)  In light of 
the foregoing, and “[t]o the extent that applicable case law and evidence was not 
considered by the [IJ] in rendering his decision,” (id.), the BIA remanded the case to the 
IJ for further proceedings.  The BIA explained that, on remand, the IJ was to consider any 
new evidence, including the State Department’s most recent country reports on China. 
  On remand, Lin submitted additional evidence in support of her application.  
In December 2008, after holding a second merits hearing, the IJ denied Lin’s application.  
The IJ, noting that he was “a bit wary of considering anecdotal evidence that was 
submitted with regard to other people’s situations at a different time and a different place 
under what have to be different circumstances,” (id. at 29), gave more weight to the 
background information than to Lin’s evidence.  The IJ explained that according to the 
State Department’s 2007 Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions , “children 
born abroad, if not registered as a permanent resident to China (i.e.[,] not entered into the 
parents’ household registration), are not considered [to be] permanent residents of China 
and therefore are not counted against the number of children allowed under China’s 
family planning law.”  ( Id. at 31-32.)  In light of this evidence, the IJ concluded that Lin 
could “avoid the problem of forced sterilization to herself and significantly reduce, if not 
eliminate, the risk of such treatment” by not registering her children as permanent 
residents in China.  ( Id. at 32.)  Although the IJ recognized that Lin’s not registering her 
 children “may involve additional costs and inconvenience to her in providing education 
and medical benefits for the children,” the IJ “d[id] not see that the imposition of such 
costs has been proven in this case to constitute a form of persecution.”  (Id.) 
  Lin appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.  In September 2009, the BIA 
upheld the IJ’s decision.  The BIA noted that documents submitted by Lin purportedly 
describing family planning policies in areas of Fujian Province — documents that were 
not “signed, notarized, or authenticated” — were insufficient to establish that “this 
particular locality represents a current exception to the general rules regarding the 
treatment of parents of children born abroad.”  ( Id. at 3.)  As for Lin’s evidence of other 
family members allegedly having been sterilized in China, the BIA found that those 
individuals were not similarly situated to Lin, and that this evidence “provide[d] no 
guidance regarding the current implementation of China’s family planning policy with 
respect to a Chinese national who now returns with two United States citizen children.”  
(Id. at 4.)  The BIA then turned to the background evidence, finding that  
[t]he Profile’s statement that children born in the United 
States to a Chinese national will not be counted against the 
number of children allowed under China’s family planning 
law if not registered as permanent residents, though higher 
costs will have to be paid for their education and other social 
benefits, indicates that [Lin] should be able to return with her 
United [S]tates citizen children without facing sterilization or 
other punitive measures. 
 
(Id.)  The BIA further found that Lin had not shown that “any potential fines imposed by 
the Chinese government will amount to persecution.”  ( Id.)  Because the BIA determined 
that Lin had failed to satisfy the standard for asylum, it held that she could not meet the 
 higher standard for withholding of removal.  Finally, the BIA concluded that she had not 





  An alien seeking asylum who does not claim past persecution must 
demonstrate that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution.  See Chavarria v. 
Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515-16 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)).  To make 
this showing, an alien must “demonstrate a subjective fear that is supported by objective 
evidence that persecution is a reasonable possibility.”  Yu v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 513 
F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  We review 
the agency’s conclusions regarding evidence of a well-founded fear of future persecution, 
as well as its other factual findings, for substantial evidence.  See Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 
515.  Under this deferential standard of review, we must uphold those findings “unless 
the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.”  Abdille v. 
Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).  We review constitutional claims de novo.  
Yusupov v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 518 F.3d 185, 197 (3d Cir. 2008). 
  The record in this case supports the agency’s finding that Lin did not 
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.  As highlighted by the IJ and BIA, the 
State Department’s 2007 Profile indicates that U.S.-born children who are not registered 
                                        
1 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal pursuant to  
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).   
 as permanent residents in China are not counted against the number of children permitted 
under China’s family planning law.  Lin’s anecdotal evidence, which includes unsigned, 
unauthenticated documents and submissions from individuals not similarly situated to 
her, does not compel a contrary finding.  Although not registering her children in China 
might lead to higher costs for their education and other social benefits, Lin has not shown 
that such costs would rise to the level of persecution.   
  Lin argues that the IJ and BIA violated her due process rights by failing to 
act as “neutral fact finders” and “impartial arbiters.”  In support of this claim, she 
emphasizes that the Government did not object to her submission of evidence to the IJ, 
conducted only a limited cross-examination at the second hearing, and did not file a brief 
in the second appeal to the BIA.  Lin’s argument is not persuasive.  Regardless of the 
Government’s action or inaction, the agency was tasked to weigh the evidence to 
determine whether Lin had demonstrated a right to relief.  That the agency did not simply 
accept Lin’s evidence and arguments at face value does not mean that the agency was 
biased against her.  Indeed, having reviewed the record, we are confident that the agency 
properly considered all of the evidence before it and rendered its decision in an impartial 
manner. 
  In light of the above, we conclude that the BIA did not err in upholding the 
IJ’s denial of Lin’s asylum claim.  Although Lin’s application sought withholding of 
 removal and CAT relief, she has waived her right to challenge the denial of those claims.
2
  
See Laborers’ Int’l Union v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An 
issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a 
passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Accordingly, we will deny Lin’s petition 
for review.        
 
                                        
2 We note without deciding that even if Lin had preserved her withholding of removal 
and CAT claims, the record would not compel a finding that she satisfied the standard for 
either form of relief. 
